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AMENDING THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT OF 1977: "CLARIFYING"
OR "GUTTING" A LAW?
Bartky A. Brenna*
S. 708, in my judgment, does its job. It guts the law. Under S 708,
bribery willflourish, foreign governments will be corrupted andfree mar-
kets will take a back seat.'
Clarifying the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act may be the most important
trade issue before us because it represents a se/f imposed constraint to
exports that comes not from the fact that we have chosen to take a strong
stance against international bribery, but because we have done so in a self
defeating manner.2
Senate bill 708,1 which sought to amend the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act of 1977 (FCPA),4 has evoked intense comment from many
sectors of society. In hearings held on S. 708 in May, June, and July of
1981, arguments on whether the FCPA should be amended were set
forth forcefully by both the bill's proponents and its opponents.5 Few
bills of such national and international import have caused such emo-
tional debate. Individual, corporate, and national ethical standards
were called into question. Corporate executives, accountants, lawyers,
and academicians testified before the Joint Senate Hearings.6
This proposal "[t]o amend and clarify the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act of 1977"7 has revived a national debate on the ethics of Amer-
ican business. The debate gained momentum in 1976 in hearings on
the FCPA.8 Approximately 435 corporations voluntarily disclosed to
* Associate Professor, Department of Legal Studies, Bowling Green State University. B.S.,
Georgetown University, 1963; M.A., Memphis State University, 1974; J.D., College of Law,
State University of New York at Buffalo, 1968.
1. Business Accounting and Foreign Trade SimpliFcation Act: Joint Hearings on S. 708 Before the
Subcomm. on Securities and the Subcomm. on International Finance and Monetary Policy of
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1981)
(statement of Senator William Proxmire, D-Wis.) [hereinafter cited as Joint Senate
Hearings].
2. Id at 59 (statement of Ambassador William E. Brock).
3. S. 708, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S13983 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1981). S. 708 has
been re-introduced in the 98th Congress as S. 414, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S
980 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1983).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78dd-l, 78dd-2, 78ff (1982).
5. See generaly Joint Senate Hearings, supra note 1.
6. Id
7. S. 414, supra note 3. This bill is entitled the "Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Sim-
plification Act."
8. Foreign Payments Disclosure. Hearings on HR 15481 and S. 3664 Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
94th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1976).
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the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that they had made
improper or questionable payments to foreign officials overseas.9 A
1976 private study by Opinion Research Corporation concluded:
Bribery, kickbacks, and political payoffs are not just the problems of a
few companies whose names have gotten in the media. As this study
shows, relatively few people can recall the names of specific companies
involved in any alleged wrongdoing. Rather, it is all of business that is
under public indictment. Most important, the demand for more mean-
ingful disclosure now and in the future fits into segments of society to
demand more disclosure about and to put more strictures on almost all
aspects of corporate operations-whether it involves advertising, Pack-
aging, product safety, discrimination, or the environment ... '
Congress passed the FCPA in 1977."1 In 1981, in response to nu-
merous complaints from the business, accounting, and legal communi-
ties, Senator John Chafee (R-R.I.) introduced S. 708 to amend the
FCPA. 12 After extensive hearings and minor modifications, S. 708 was
passed by the Senate on November 23, 198 1.'1 H.R. 2530, a bill similar
to S. 708, was introduced into the House of Representatives but failed
to pass.' 4 Both bills have been re-introduced in the present session of
Congress. Senate bill 708 has been re-designated as Senate bill 414.11
INTRODUCTION
This article will analyze the FCPA in light of the proposed amend-
9. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE SENATE BANKING, HOUSING
AND URBAN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL
CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as SEC RE-
PORT].
The bribery of foreign officials and political parties was documented, and led to the
downfall of government officials in Japan, the Netherlands, and Korea. (See Joint Senate
Hearings, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of Senator William Proxmire, D-Wis.)).
10. 24 ORC PUBLIC OPINION INDEX: REPORT TO MANAGEMENT 80146 (June, 1976) (emphasis
in original). This survey was part of a continuing confidential study of basic opinions about
issues affecting business. Results were based on telephone interviews with a national
robability sample of 1,016 persons of ages 18 or over, conducted between May 20 and May
3, 1976. Opinion Research Corporation recommended to its business clients that "consider-
ing the current climate of public opinion, all corporations, big and small, on their own
through their associations, might well get ahead of the game by meshing their own efforts to
define and control internal ethics with any proposed action ultimately undertaken by govern-
ment. Failure to do so could be very costly in the long run." Id
II. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977). Congres-
sional action was completed Dec. 6, 1977, 123 CONG. REC. 38603 (1977) (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78ff, and 78dd-l to -2 (1982)), and President Carter signed the FCPA into
law Dec. 19, 1977, 13 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1909 (1977).
12. 127 CONG. REC. S2126 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1976).
13. S. 708, supra note 3.
14. 127 CONG. REC. H4500 (daily ed. July 16, 1981). H.R. 2530 was not reported out of
committee.
15. S. 414, supra note 3. A bill similar to H.R. 2530 has been introduced into the House of
Representatives recently: Representative Mica, D-Fla., sponsored H.R. 2157, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess., 129 CONG. REC. El 127 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Mica bill]. In
addition, Representative Timothy Wirth, D-Colo., sponsored H.R. 2754, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H2369 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Wirth bill].
Journal of Legislation
ments to the Act as set out in S. 414 and in two other major proposals,
H.R. 215716 (Mica bill) introduced by Representative Daniel Mica (D-
Fla.) and H.R. 2754 (Wirth bill)' 7 introduced by Representative
Timothy E. Wirth (D-Colo.). It will then examine the potential legal,
economic, and ethical implications of the proposed amendments for the
business community and the nation. The accounting and anti-bribery
sections of the FCPA will be analyzed first in light of the criticism to
which they have been subject since passage. Second, the proposed
amendments to both sections will be examined for their impact on the
business community and on the nation. Third, the article will raise
several important policy issues which, if not addressed by the drafters
of the proposed amendments, would "gut" the FCPA.
While amending the FCPA may cause the business community to
experience a short-term relaxation of prohibitions, these relaxed stan-
dards may soon be replaced by a more stringent version of the FCPA,
especially in light of recent reports noting alleged violations of the Act
by IT&T and Ashland Oil.' 8 This article concludes that S. 414 and the
Mica bill could be perceived by the business community and the Amer-
ican public as seriously weakening, if not "gutting", the FCPA. This
perception is enhanced when the chief of the SEC's Enforcement Divi-
sion lists the FCPA as "19th out of 21" in terms of the division's en-
forcement priorities.' 9 Furthermore, the recent elimination of the
Multi-National Branch of the Criminal Fraud Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice,20 which reviewed hundreds of cases for criminal prose-
cution prior to 1981, gives reason to question whether the Act is being
seriously enforced.2' In its conclusion, this article offers substantial
proposals for legislative reform of the FCPA.
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977
Accounting Sections
The accounting provisions of the FCPA22 amended section 13(b) of
16. Mica bill, supra note 15.
17. Wirth bill, supra note 15.
18. See Ashland Payments on Oil Questioned, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1983, at 1, col. i; Analysis of
IT&T's Report Shows Problems in Halting Questionable Foreign Payments, N.Y. Times, June
3, 1982, at 19, col. 2.
19. Hudson, SECs Enforcer Runs Tight Ship, But Critics Charge He's Too Soft, Wall St. J., June
28, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
20. In September, 1982, the Multi-National Branch and three other branches of the Criminal
Division of the Department of Justice were reorganized into a general Fraud Section of the
Criminal Division.
21. As of February, 1982, three prosecutors were working full-time and five were working part-
time on FCPA cases. Only 14 cases remained open, and nine were thought to be
prosecutable. See Jackson, Overseas Bribery Gets a Lot Less Attention After Cutbacks by the
Justice Department, Wall St. J., February 22, 1983, at 33, col. 4.
22. Section 102 of the FCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (1982) states:
Every issuer. . . shall-
(A) make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accu-
rately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer;
and
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the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).2 3 The record
keeping provision 24 of the statute requires that every company regis-
tered under the Exchange Act, whether or not it does business interna-
tionally, maintain a system of accounting controls which will provide
reasonable assurances that a company's records "accurately and fairly
reflect its transactions"" and the disposition of its assets. The account-
ing control provisions require that each company covered by the FCPA
have internal controls sufficient to provide "reasonable assurance[s]"
that certain objectives will be met. 6 Wilful violation of these provi-
sions by registrants or any person involved in the direction or manage-
ment of a corporation is punishable under the Exchange Act.27
Punishment may include a fine of up to $10,000 and/or imprisonment
for up to five years, or a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
civil enforcement action.28 The SEC jointly administers the Act with
the Department of Justice and has the power to recommend criminal
prosecution or to bring a civil action. The threshhold basis of liability
for civil injunctive actions brought to enforce the FCPA is a negligence
standard. Liability under the FCPA will result if one's actions deviate
from what is expected of a "reasonably prudent business person."29 In
(B) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to pro-
vide reasonable assurances that-
(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management's general or specific
authorization;
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation of financial
statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other
criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to maintain accountability for assets;
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management's general or
specific authorization; and
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing assets at
reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (1982).
24. Id § 78m (1982).
25. Id. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (1982).
26. Id
27. Id § 78ff(a) (1982).
28. Id
29. See Foreign Corrupt Practice 4ct-Oversight. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommu-
nications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, House of
Representatives, 97th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. (1981 & 1982) [hereinafter cited as House Sub-
committee Hearings].
Chairman Shad of the SEC, in response to the House Subcommittee request, stated that
as of November, 1981, it had brought sixteen enforcement actions, all of which were civil.
They included fifteen injunctive actions and one administrative action. Included in these
enforcement actions were ten defendants or respondents who consented to settlements with-
out denying or admitting guilt. Three of the injunctive actions were still pending. Violations
of the FCPA accounting provisions were encountered in connection with SEC inquiries into
violation of the anti-fraud provision, periodic reporting requirements, and proxy provisions
of the Exchange Act, specifically sections 10(b), 13(a) and 14(a). The amount involved
ranged from $110,000 to $23,000,000. The cases involved improper accounting in four cate-
gories of conduct: (1) questionable or illegal corporate payments; (2) exaggeration of the
company sales and assets, or the failure to have adequate records; (3) misappropriation or
diversion of corporate assets in cases not involving questionable or illegal payments; and
(4) unauthorized management prerequisites. Id at 124.
In Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980), the United States Supreme Court criticized this
standard, and held that the SEC is required to establish a scienter standard for instances in
which companies had failed to disclose questionable payments made domestically or abroad.
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1974 the SEC determined that non-disclosure of any illegal or ques-
tionable payments abroad is material to investors because such pay-
ments affect a corporation's managerial integrity. 30 The SEC instituted
a voluntary disclosure program based on its claim of material nondis-
closure and submitted a report to Congress making recommendations
which were later included in the accounting section of the FCPA.3 1
The SEC then promulgated rules and provided guidelines for those
corporations subject to the FCPA.32
Critique of the Accounting Provisions
The major criticisms of the accounting provisions of the FCPA fall
into three categories: (1) the cost of compliance due to the vagueness of
the standards in the record keeping and disclosure section; (2) the lack
of a materiality standard as to what must be disclosed; and (3) criminal
penalties for failure to meet record keeping and accounting control
provisions.
In order to determine the validity of these criticisms, Congress re-
quested that the General Accounting Office (GAO) undertake a study
of corporations subject to the FCPA.3 3 When companies were asked
whether the cost of compliance outweighed the benefits received, 56.4%
responded in the affirmative.34 Of that group, when asked to determine
to what extent this non-benefit cost increased the overall cost of ac-
counting, 27.8% responded, to "little or no extent," 49.5% to "some ex-
tent," 13.4% to a "moderate extent," 4.1% to a "great extent," and 5.2%
to a "very great extent." 3
5
The lack of a materiality standard regarding what must be disclosed
under the FCPA has led to confusion in the business and legal commu-
nities. The American Bar Association Committee on Corporate Law
30. The SEC undertook the monitoring of questionable payments in 1974 based solely on its
authority under federal securities laws to require disclosure of "material" information.
While several Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals have supported the SEC enforcement stafs
broad interpretation of "materiality," see, e.g., Weisberg v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 609
F.2d 650 (2nd Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 1951 (1980), others have rejected the SEC's
view on the materiality of questionable payments, see, e.g., Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d
761 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982).
31. See SEC REPORT, supra note 9.
32. See Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 34-14 478 (February 16, 1978), 43
Fed. Reg. 7752 (February 24, 1978), 14 SEC Docket 4 (February 28, 1978) (informing issuers
of the substance of the FCPA, and noting that "legality or illegality of a particular transac-
tion is one of the factors that must be assessed in determining its materiality [for disclosure
purposes]"). Id at 7753.
33. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPACT OF FOREIGN CORRUPT PRAC-
TICES ACT ON U.S. BUSINESS: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS (1981) [hereinafter cited as GAO
REPORT].
34. Id at 58.
35. Id at 58, 59. See Joint Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 166 (testimony of Mr. John Subak,
Group Vice President and General Counsel, Rohn and Haar Co.); but cf. id at 452 (state-
ment of John C. Burton, Professor of Accounting and Finance, Graduate School of Business,
Columbia University). See also House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 29, Ist & 2nd
Sess. 176 (1981 & 1982) (testimony of SEC Chairman Shad) (discussing whether these costs
are front end costs or continuing costs due to the degree of detail required by "the reasonable
detail standard").
[Vol. 11:56
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and Accounting concluded that, based on the legislative history of the
FCPA, a "materiality standard" existed.36 The SEC, however, con-
cluded that Congress intended that a "reasonableness standard" be
used in reviewing cases brought under the FCPA.37 The GAO, on the
other hand, has recommended that a "materiality standard" not be
adopted by Congress.38 The GAO concluded that the adoption of such
a standard would weaken the intent of the accounting provisions of the
FCPA.39 It argued that while "materiality" is geared to disclosure for
investors, it is not appropriate for assessing the adequacy of internal
accounting. 4° The GAO pointed out that the FCPA seeks to provide
disclosure not for the purpose of investor knowledge but to prevent
bribery.4'
A third criticism of the accounting provisions of the FCPA42 has
been the imposition of criminal penalties for technical or insignificant
errors.43 The SEC has stated that it would recommend criminal prose-
cution "only in the most serious and egregious cases." ' However, be-
cause of the discretionary and often subjective nature of such a
judgment, the business community has argued for decriminalization.45
Anti-Bribery Section
In addition to the accounting provisions of the FCPA which man-
date disclosure of questionable or illegal payments, Congress has also
prohibited the bribery of any foreign official.46 Section 78dd-l(a) of
the FCPA provides:
It shall be unlawful for any issuer. . . officer, director, employee, or
agent of such issuer or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such
issuer, to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment,
promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer,
gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value
47
In passing the FCPA, Congress sought to obtain the "broadest"
possible application of the Act to international business by incorporat-
ing the language of the domestic mail fraud statute.48 The Supreme
Court has interpreted this statute liberally, stating that it must be suf-
36. GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 19, 25-26.
37. Id at 19, 26-27.
38. id at 28.
39. id at 30.
40. Id at 28, 30.
41. Id
42. Hudson, supra note 19.
43. GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 31-33.
44. Id at 71.
45. See Joint Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 141 (testimony of R. McNeil).
46. Act of Dec. 19, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 30A(a), 91 Stat. 1494, 1495 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78dd-I (1982)).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-I (1982).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
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ficiently flexible to reach "new" fraud not yet identified. 9
Section 30A(a)3 of the FCPA defines the requisite intent necessary
for a violation under the Act:
[A]ny person, while knowing or having reason to know that all or a
portion of such money or thing of value will be offered, given, or prom-
ised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official, to any foreign polit-
ical party or official thereof, or to any candidate for foreign political
office ... 5
The intent required to commit a crime is most important from the
viewpoint of prosecutorial discretion. In addition, it is important to
corporate counsel who wish to advise their clients on the legality of
participating in a particular international transaction.
In order to determine whether there has been a violation under the
FCPA, it is necessary to know how the term "foreign official" is defined
within the Act. The Act defines "foreign official" as "any officer or
employee of a foreign government, or any department, agency or in-
strumentality thereof, or any person acting in an official capacity for or
on behalf of any such government or department, agency or instrumen-
tality."' I The FCPA excludes persons who perform essentially ministe-
rial duties and explicitly allows "facilitating" or "grease" payments. 2
These payments are not made to obtain or retain business, but merely
to expedite a business activity in which the ministerial level employee is
already employed. An example is the payment of thirty dollars to a
customs official to move paperwork along so that a shipment of non-
durable goods can be unloaded quickly. Many foreign governments
permit such facilitating payments even though they are illegal in the
United States and several foreign countries. 3 The anti-bribery section
of the FCPA applies to: (1) issuers "of domestic concerns"; (2) officers;
(3) directors; (4) employees; (5) agents; and (6) some stockholders of
issuers of domestic concerns.54 All "domestic concerns" includes both
SEC registrants and non-registrants.55
Critique of the Anti-Bribery Section
Corporate and government officials, as well as academicians and
lawyers, have criticized the bribery sections of the FCPA for vaguely
defining what constitutes compliance.5 6 Some commentators have sug-
gested that this vagueness has forced American corporations to forego
49. See United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1974).
50. Act of Dec. 19, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 30A(a)3, 91 Stat. 1494, 1495 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(3) (1982)) (emphasis added).
51. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(d)(2) (1982).
52. Id
53. See Comment, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977" A Solution or a Problem? I1 CAL.
W. INT'L L.J. 111, 131 (1981).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c) (1982).
55. Id § 78dd-2(d)(1) (1982).
56. See generally Joint Senate Hearings, supra note 1. See also H. WEISBERG AND E.
REICHENBERG, THE PRICE OF AMBIGUITY 13 (1981).
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business opportunities abroad for fear of violating the FCPA and in-
curring its stiff criminal sanctions. 7
In its study of the FCPA, the General Accounting Office found that
of "the 30% of our respondents who reported that the Act had caused a
decrease in their overseas business, approximately 70% rated the clarity
of at least one of the anti-bribery provisions as inadequate or very in-
adequate."58 The major ambiguities perceived by the respondents in
FCPA antibribery provisions were:
1) the degree of responsibility a company has for the actions of the
foreign agents;
2) the definition of the term "foreign official";
3) whether a payment is a bribe (illegal under the FCPA) or a "facili-
tating payment" (legal under the FCPA); and
4) the dual jurisdiction of the SEC and Department of Justice. 9
"Reason to Know" Provisions
Almost fifty percent of the respondents surveyed by the GAO found
this language either "very inadequate" or "marginally inadequate."6
Lawyers and legal scholars have continued to argue that a "reason to
know" standard increases the potential liability of a company and its
officers for the acts of foreign agents or more closely affiliated third
parties even if the company is unable to monitor or control their con-
duct. Several recurring questions have been asked. What does "reason
to know" mean? Is reason to know something less than full actual
knowledge? If so, how much less, and should it be used in prosecution
of criminal conduct?6' Those favoring the language as it stands under
the FCPA point out that "reason to know" language exists in twenty-
nine provisions of other federal laws.62 An analysis of these provisions,
however, shows that thirteen of the twenty-nine provisions are civil or
administrative statutes as contrasted with the FCPA, a criminal statute
that provides for up to five years imprisonment.63 The remaining provi-
sions fall into areas relating to federal safety standards or other types of
regulatory procedures. Furthermore, "reason to know" language is in-
cluded in eight provisions of the criminal code which may be replaced
by the proposed Federal Criminal Code revisions.'
57. Id.
58. See GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 38, 59. It should be noted that 67.7% of the respondents
stated that the FCPA had little or no impact on business. None were of the opinion that the
FCPA had a positive impact on their business.
59. GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 38.
60. GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 60.
61. See Hibey, The Practical Necessityfor Amendment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 10
HOFSTRA L.R. 1121 (1981-82).
62. See Joint Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 416 (testimony of W. Dobrovir).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c) (1982).
64. See Memo from Deputy Attorney General Schmults to Staff of House Energy and Com-
merce Committees (July 26, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Schmults Memo]. Mr. Schmults dis-
cussed recent proposals to revise the federal criminal code. In notes six through nine, the
memo cites all provisions in which reason to know language is included. See also Fedders,
19841
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Perhaps the most significant problem is that no precedent exists in-
terpreting the "reason to know" language of the FCPA. In addition,
because both the Department of Justice and the SEC have joint en-
forcement authority, a question has been raised as to whether the agen-
cies have the same interpretation of the "reason to know" language.
Despite President Carter's announcement that the Department of Jus-
tice would "provide guidance" to the business community, the Depart-
ment and the SEC have not responded enthusiastically.6 5  A related
concern stems from parallel investigations, wherein the Department of
Justice is pursuing a criminal investigation before an impanelled grand
jury and the SEC staff is conducting a civil investigation. Should cor-
porate counsel advise their clients to remain silent pursuant to the 5th
Amendment66 and prevent the SEC from engaging in document dis-
covery because of the possible implications in a criminal proceeding?
In doing so, will a client be biased in a civil proceeding? In Dresser v.
United States,6 7 the court held that parallel investigations by the SEC
and Department of Justice may be conducted as long as they are in-
dependent and legally authorized.68
Definition of a "Foreign Official"
The FCPA focuses on the recipient of a facilitating payment, not on
The "'Reason to Know" Standard-A Troublesome Ambiguity in the U.S. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 4 MIDDLE EAST EXECUTIVE REPORTS 2, 20 & n.14 (July, 1981) which lists the
provisions; R. BECKLER, A. LEVENSON & R. SHINE, THE NEW REVIEW PROCEDURE UNDER
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT II 105-08 (1980) which lists and describes the
provisions.
65. On September 26, 1978, President Carter announced that he was directing the Department of
Justice to "provide guidance to the business community concerning its enforcement priorities
under the recently enacted foreign anti-bribery statute." President's Statement on United
States Export Policy, 14 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1631, 1633 (Sept. 26, 1978). The De-
partment of Justice, however, responded negatively, stating "all they (businessmen) want to
know is who they can bribe and who they can't. Well, we're not going to tell them-we'll go
down kicking and screaming on this one." Berry, Justice is Reluctant Guide On New Bribe
Legislation, Wash. Post, Oct. 10, 1978, at D7, col. 2. The Department of Justice reiterated
this view in hearings on S. 708, the Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification
Act, adding, however, that if the law required guidelines, it would issue them. See Joint
Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 77-78 (statement of E.C. Schmults, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral); S. 708, supra note 3, § 8, provides for the issuance of guidelines by an interagency task
force. The Department of Justice created the FCPA Review Procedure in March, 1980. The
procedure has been criticized because it permits the Justice Department to use the informa-
tion, submitted by advice-seeking companies, in the Department's subsequent prosecutions
for violations of the FCPA. See generally Surrey & Popkin, An Exercise in Non-Guidance:
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review Procedure, 3 MID. E. EXECUTIVE REP. 3 (May,
1980). See also GAO REPORT, supra note 27.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
67. 628 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 993 (1980). See Hibey, supra
note 61, for an analysis of these issues.
68. Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1377. See Timmeny, SEC Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 2 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. ANN. 25 (1979). Wallace L. Timmeny, former Deputy
Director of the SEC Division of Enforcement, promotes the theory that doing business in
certain unspecified foreign countries where corruption was known to be commonplace would
constitute a "red flag" warning that any payment to a local agent might involve a bribe and,
thereby, require that a U.S. entity conduct a far-reaching investigation prior to engaging the
agent in order to avoid a charge of negligent, or even reckless, violation of the FCPA.
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the purpose for which the payment is made. It defines "foreign offi-
cial" as any officer or employee of a foreign government or one of its
departments, agencies, or instrumentalities.69 This definition expressly
excludes any employee whose duties are "essentially ministerial or cler-
ical."7 This definition implies that employees who are excluded can
legally receive "facilitating payments."'" Corporate officials have fre-
quently complained that this language is unclear. Are employees of a
publicly held nationalized corporation considered "foreign officials"?
Is an official or member of a family residing in a foreign country who is
also involved in the private sector a "foreign official"? How should the
law treat individuals who simultaneously hold positions in both gov-
ernment and business? Can an excluded "ministerial or clerical" em-
ployee be paid a "facilitating payment" to use his influence to induce a
"foreign official" to act as long as the clerical employee does not pay
the official from funds received from a United States corporation?
Corrupt Payments
The FCPA proscribes only "corrupt" payments. The legislative his-
tory of the FCPA defines a corrupt payment as one made "to induce
the recipient to misuse his official position in order to wrongfully direct
business to the payor or his client" and requires an "evil motive or
purpose."72 Because ministerial employees are excluded from the defi-
nition of foreign official, it is clear the FCPA was not intended to pro-
scribe grease or facilitating payments.73 Moreover, social gifts or
routine expenditures for marketing products are lawful. However, con-
sistent complaints about enforcement officials' interpretation have led
to requests for a congressional clarification of the statute.74
Facilitating Payments
Despite the apparently clear legislative intent that facilitating pay-
ments to ministerial or clerical employees not be proscribed, thirty-
eight percent of those responding to the GAO questionnaire rated the
69. 15 U.S.C. § 78-2(d) (1982).
70. Id §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(d)(2) (1982).
71. S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4098, 4108.
72. Id; H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1977).
73. S. REP. No. 114, supra note 71, at 10, reprinted at 4108. The Senate Banking Committee
Report stated:
The statute covers payments made to foreign officials for the purpose of obtaining
business or influencing legislation or regulations. The statute does not, therefore,
cover so-called 'grease payments' such as payments for expediting shipments through
customs or placing a transatlantic telephone call, securing required permits, or ob-
taining adequate police protection, transactions which may involve even the proper
performance of duties.
The importance of the corrupt intent requirement is discussed at length in Elden and
Sableman, Negligence Is Not Corruption. The Scienter Requirement of the Foreign Corrupt
PracticesAct, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 819 (1981).
74. Joint Senate Hearings, supra note I, at 154 (testimony of R. McNeil); id. at 265 (testimony of
M. Feldman).
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clarity of the provisions inadequate.75 The dilemma raised is that a
large corrupt payment to an official with "ministerial" duties may not
be prohibited while a small payment to expedite customs papers may
be prohibited if made to a senior "official."'7 6 Furthermore, middle-
level employees of American corporations do not fully understand
what constitutes a facilitating payment. The decision to make such a
payment must often be made quickly because hesitation might cause a
delay in transportation or unloading.
A related problem is the lack of uniformity among nations regard-
ing the propriety of facilitating payments.77 While a foreign agent may
legally receive such a payment under the law of his country, the Ameri-
can corporation making the payment may be violating the FCPA.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FCPA
Introduction
This section will analyze Senate bill 41478 and other legislative pro-
posals which would amend the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. This
analysis will focus primarily on S. 41479 which contains detailed pro-
posals to amend the FCPA. Two additional bills to amend the FCPA
are those introduced by Representative Daniel Mica80 (D-Fla.) (Mica
bill) and Representative Timothy Wirth 81 (D-Col.) (Wirth bill). The
Mica bill adopts much of the S. 414 but offers important modifications.
The Wirth bill would slightly modify the FCPA. These proposed bills
would amend the FCPA in four substantive areas: (1) title and juris-
diction; (2) accounting and record keeping; (3) bribery proscriptions;
and (4) the recommendation suggesting that the executive branch seek
an international agreement on bribery.
Proposed Amendments to Title and Jurisdictional Provisions
Senate bill 414 would retitle the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as
the "Business Practices and Records Act."82 This change would reflect
the fact that the FCPA applies to all entities whether or not they par-
ticipate in international business.8 3 Additionally, it "removes the im-
plication of wrongdoing embodied in the former title."84 This change
brought a sharp response from critics of S. 414. Congressman Timothy
75. GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 60.
76. GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 41.
77. See Comment, supra note 53, at 129-3 1, for a list of countries including France, Switzerland,
Jordan, El Salvador, and Saudi Arabia which prohibit facilitating payments.
78. S. 708, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S2148 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1981). This bill was
re-introduced in Congress as S. 414. See S. 414, supra note 3.
79. S. 414, upra note 3.
80. Mica bill, supra note 15.
81. Wirth bill, supra note 15.
82. S. 414, supra note 3, § 3. This bill would change the name of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (FCPA) to the Business Practices and Records Act (BPRA).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (1982).
84. See S. REP. No. 209, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1981).
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Wirth (D-Col.) stated: "[bleginning with the change in the name of the
law, S. 708 [S. 414's predecessor] would in my view send the message
that the United States Government was unconcerned about bribery-
even to the extent that corruption would be called by another name.
85
Because this provision does not go to the substance of the bill, it is an
unnecessary change which could send wrong signals to those who
would interpret this as a change of congressional intent.
The Mica bill was introduced to amend the Export Administration
Act of 1979.86 If enacted it would retitle the FCPA the "Foreign Trade
Practices Act of 1983. "87 This change would emphasize the Act's role
in seeking restrictions on a limited number of activities of businesses
involved in international trade.
Senate bill 414 would give the Department of Justice sole jurisdic-
tion to enforce the anti-bribery provisions of the Act and subpoena
power to conduct civil investigations.8 8 The FCPA has a dual jurisdic-
tion provision whereby both the Department of Justice89 and the SEC9°
have authority to conduct investigations. Disagreement by these agen-
cies over interpretation of the bribery provisions has led businessmen
and lawyers to complain that both the content and the standards used
for enforcement are unclear and ambiguous.9' Under S. 414, the SEC
would have sole authority to enforce the accounting provision.92 Addi-
tionally the Department of Justice would be required to issue guide-
lines and render advisory opinions which would be final and not
subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. 93
The Mica bill would transfer jurisdiction over the Act's bribery pro-
vision to the Secretary of Commerce.94 In addition, it would vest au-
thority in the Secretary with the concurrence of the Attorney General,
to provide enforcement guidelines and issue limited advisory opin-
ions.95 As in S. 414, such opinions would be final and not subject to
Freedom of Information Act disclosure.96 When first introduced, the
Mica bill transferred the accounting provision to the Secretary of Com-
merce. However, when referred to committee, this section was re-
moved and the SEC retained authority over the accounting provision.
85. Letter from Representative Timothy E. Wirth, D-Colo., to Senator John H. Chafee, R-R.I.,
(Dec. 14, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Letter of Wirth]. See Signs of Compromise Seen in Effort
to Narrow FCPA, Legal Times, Jan. 10, 1983, at 2, col. 1.
86. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (Supp. V 1981).
87. Mica bill, supra note 15.
88. S. 414, supra note 3, §§ 5(b), 7(1983). See also 127 CONG. REC. S2150-51 (daily ed. Mar. 12,
1981) for an explanation of some of these sections when the original bill, S. 708, was
introduced.
89. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a), 78dd-2(c) (1982).
90. See S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4098, 4109.
91. See GAO REPORT, supra note 33, app. IV, V.
92. S. 414, supra note 3, § 4.
93. S. 414, supra note 3, § 8.
94. Mica bill, supra note 15, § 8A(c).
95. Mica bill, supra note 15, § 8A(d).
96 Id
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The Mica bill meets a jurisdictional concern of the export business
community which has criticized the dual authority of the Department
of Justice and the SEC under the FCPA. Because, as some commenta-
tors have suggested, the Department of Commerce was set up to serve
the interests of the business community, the Department may be per-
ceived as being more susceptible to drafting less restrictive guidelines
for conduct to be referred to the Justice Department for prosecution
under the anti-bribery provisions of the Mica bill. If enacted, the Mica
bill would be perceived as lacking serious intent to prohibit improper
and illegal acts overseas by American corporations. It would require
the Secretary of Commerce to recommend the prosecution of American
businesses and would thus present a serious conflict of interest for the
Secretary.
Impact of Proposed Amendments on FCPA's Accounting Provisions
Senate bill 414 retains the FCPA requirements that business main-
tain accurate records and internal accounting controls. The bill inte-
grates these requirements by tying each to a concept of
"reasonableness." It retains the "reasonable detail," "reasonable assur-
ance," and "accurate and fair" language of the FCPA, and defines each
of these terms.97 S. 414 would define the "reasonable detail" standard
as requiring sufficient detail "to permit preparation of financial state-
ments in conformity with generally accepted accounting fundamen-
tals .. ,,9" Moreover, S. 414 defines "reasonable detail" and
"reasonable assurance" as "such level of detail and degree of assurance
as would satisfy prudent individuals in the conduct of their own affairs,
having in mind a comparison between benefits to be obtained and cost
incurred in obtaining such benefits."99 Such language would allow for
a good faith defense. However, a difficulty arises in using cost-benefit
analysis as a measurement technique. What is to be included in such
an analysis? Will only quantitative factors be included, or will qualita-
tive and equity factors also be involved?"°
Senate bill 414 does not include a "materiality standard" as origi-
nally proposed in Senate bill 708. 1' S. 414, as passed by the Senate,
would impose liability if disclosure lacked sufficient detail to satisfy the
"prudent individual" standard." 2 This standard was proposed to allay
accountants' fears that liability would be imposed for relatively minor
omissions in disclosure requirements under S. 414. °3
97. S. 414, supra note 3, § 6.
98. S. 414, supra note 3, § 4(a).
99. S. 414, supra note 3, § 6.
100. See B. Shaw and A. Wolfe, A Legal and Ethical Critique of the Use of Cost-Benet fAnalysis in
Public Law, 19 Hous. L. REV. 899 (1982).
101. S. 708, supra note 3.
102. S. 414, supra note 3, § 6.
103. See 127 CONG. REC. S13972 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1981) (statement of Senator John Heinz,
R-Pa.).
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Senate bill 414 also incorporates an intent standard within the rec-
ord keeping provision. Issuers will only be liable for "knowingly" fail-
ing to prepare and maintain records in "reasonable detail.""° This bill
would raise the standard of proof for prosecution in foreign bribery
cases 10 5 in an attempt to alleviate the fears of issuers of securities that
inadvertent or innocent errors might lead to criminal prosecution. 10 6 It
does not, however, allow companies to look the other way and thereby
exempt themselves from the requirements of the accounting provisions.
This intent standard would place a higher burden of proof on the SEC
when bringing charges. In addition, the cost of internal accounting
controls would be decreased.
Furthermore, S. 414 would require an SEC reporting company
holding more than fifty percent of the voting stock of a domestic or
foreign corporation to make a "good faith" effort to influence the firm
to comply with the bill's accounting provisions."0 7 The FCPA has been
criticized for failing to define a parent corporation's liability for viola-
tions by a subsidiary. Under S. 414, it would be presumed that a parent
corporation had complied by making a good faith effort to use such
influence. '0 8
The Mica bill would impact on the accounting standards of the
FCPA in a manner similar to S. 414. The Mica bill would require pub-
licly held companies to maintain accounting controls sufficient to
demonstrate compliance with all provisions of the bill and to meet gen-
erally accepted accounting standards.0 9 Persons failing to comply with
these requirements would be protected from criminal prosecution un-
less they knowingly circumvented such internal controls. Violators
would also be protected from civil injunctions as long as they could
demonstrate that they had made a good faith attempt to comply." 0
The FCPA accounting provision would be so weakened by the
Mica bill and S. 414 that it is unlikely that any civil or criminal actions
would ever be brought. The burden of proof on the government would
104. S. 414, supra note 3, § 4(b).
105. S. 414, supra note 3, § 5.
106. See Joint Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 361 (testimony of R. Hills).
107. S. 414, supra note 3, § 4(b).
108. The Senate Report for the FCPA notes that a U.S. company which ignores bribes made by
its foreign subsidiary in order to raise "ignorance" as a defense to the charge of bribery, could
be violating the FCPA's strict accounting controls. The argument runs that under the ac-
counting section (15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (1982)) "no off-the-books accounting fund could be
lawfully maintained, either by a U.S. parent or by a foreign subsidiary .. " S. REP. No.
114, supra note 71, reprinted at 4109. Although this view only touches the narrow case of a
U.S. parent and a foreign subsidiary, the committee clearly recognized that the bill would
not cover cases "where there is no nexus with U.S. interstate commerce." Id (emphasis ad-
ded). Using this as a test for liability, it then follows that the legislative proscription should
include a domestic parent corporation with domestic (or foreign) subsidiaries, only where the
proper scienter was involved. Thus, where good faith efforts destroy this culpability, compli-
ance should be presumed.
109. Mica bill, supra note 15, § 8A(e).
110. Mica bill, supra note 15, § 8A(e)(3)(A).
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be insurmountable."' These amendments would again open the door
to the non-disclosure violations which precipitated the passage of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977.
The Wirth bill would define the terms "reasonable assurance" and
"reasonable detail" as used in the FCPA by using the term "reason-
able" to mean that which would "satisfy a prudent individual in busi-
ness in a like position under similar circumstances, and having in mind
a comparison between benefits to be obtained and costs to be incurred
in obtaining such benefits." ' 2 The approach of the Wirth bill is to add
legislative definition to the present FCPA accounting standards. How-
ever, the bill fails to delineate the variables which would be included in
a cost-benefit analysis. In addition, the Wirth bill would require SEC
reporting companies with a controlling interest in a domestic or foreign
corporation to use their influence to encourage such firms to comply
with the FCPA standards." 3 Any corporation which holds less than
twenty percent of the voting securities of another corporation would be
rebuttably presumed not to control that corporation and thus a good
faith defense would be available to it." 1
4
Impact of Proposed Amendments on Anti-Bribery
Provisions of the FCPA
The central focus of S. 414 is to clarify ambiguities in the FCPA
which have caused anxiety among businessmen and corporate coun-
sel.' 15 However, it retains the view that the principal goal of the
FCPA-to prevent United States corporations from bribing foreign of-
ficials-is a worthwhile goal which should be pursued. " 16 To this end it
proposes five changes in the FCPA. First, S. 414 and the Mica bill
would remove the "reason to know" standard for liability under the
FCPA and substitute the following language:
It shall be unlawful for any domestic concern, or any officer, director
or employee, or shareholder thereof acting on behalf of such domestic
concern to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce corruptly to direct or authorize, expressly or by a
course of conduct, a third party in furtherance of a payment, gift, offer,
or promise of anything of value to a foreign official."i 7
Second, S. 414 excludes from liability and explicitly allows extrater-
ritorial payments for the following five purposes:
(1) any facilitating or expediting payment to a foreign official the
111. See Joint Senate Hearings, supra note I, at 460 (statement of J. Burton).
112. Wirth bill, supra note 15, § 1(4).
113. Wirth bill, supra note 15, § 1(5).
114. Id.
115. See Joint Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 75 (testimony of E. Schmults).
116. See S. REP. No. 209, supra note 84, at 12.
117. S. 414, supra note 3, § 5(b) (emphasis added). See also Mica bill, supra note 15, § 8A(a),
which would amend the Export Administration Act of 1981, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2420 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981).
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purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the performance of a rou-
tine governmental action by a foreign official;
(2) any payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value to a
foreign official which is lawful under the law and regulations of the
foreign official's country;
(3) any payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value
which constitutes a courtesy, a token of regard or esteem, or in return
for hospitality;
(4) any expenditures, including travel and lodging expenses, asso-
ciated with the selling or purchasing of goods or services or with the
demonstration or explanation of products; or
(5) any ordinary expenditures, including travel and lodging ex-
penses, associated with the performance of a contract with a foreign
government or agency thereof."l8
Third, S. 414 would consolidate enforcement authority for the anti-
bribery provisions within the Department of Justice." ,9 The responsi-
bility for enforcing the accounting provisions of the bill would remain
with the SEC.'2 ' Fourth, S. 414 and the Mica bill would provide the
exclusive federal statute proscribing foreign bribery.' 21
Finally, S. 414 would require the Attorney General to issue guide-
lines to assist the business community in complying with the anti-brib-
ery provisions. 22 Procedures for requesting interpretations would be
included and all such requests would be exempt from disclosure under
the Freedom of Information Act. 123
Change of "Reason to Know" Standard
Senate bill 414 replaces the "reason to know" standard in the FCPA
with the phrase "corruptly to direct or authorize, expressly or by a
course of conduct .. .. ,,24 This revised language has led to charges
that S. 414 would allow corporate officers to escape liability. It has
been argued that such a revision would encourage lower level employ-
ees either not to report possible violations of the FCPA or to undertake
violations with the tacit understanding that the employee could partici-
pate in bribery as long as it is not reported to corporate officers or di-
118. S. 414, supra note 3, § 5(b). The words "foreign officials" are eliminated from the Mica bill,
thus allowing facilitating payments to anyone for the purpose of securing performance or
expediting a routine government action. This would further open a "pandora's box." The
Wirth bill seeks to clarify the FCPA by defining what duties are "essentially ministerial" or
"clerical" thus making such individuals eligible for facilitating payments. It would oppose
payments to anyone else for any other purpose.
119. S. 414, supra note 3, § 7.
120. S. 414, supra note 3, § 5(b). The Mica bill would shift authority to the Secretary of Com-
merce from the Justice Department for the bribery provisions, and retain SEC civil authority
over the accounting provisions. See notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
121. S. 414, supra note 3, § 4; Mica bill, supra note 15, § 2.
122. S. 414, supra note 73, § 8.
123. Id
124. S. 414, supra note 3, § 5(b).
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rectors. 125  Critics note that "reason to know" language has been
incorporated in the majority of the Restatement compilations, the Uni-
form Commercial Code, and in other federal criminal statutes.126 They
argue that based on case law interpretation of other federal statutes
containing "reason to know" language, some scienter127 must be pres-
ent. Unreasonable requests for information by corporate officers are
not required. "One has reason to know a fact only if a reasonable per-
son in his or her position would infer such facts from other facts al-
ready known to him or her."'' 28
It is not at all clear that the language of S. 414 clarifies the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act as it purports to do. Of particular concern are
the words "course of conduct" as defined by the Senate Banking Re-
port. 129 For example, the report notes that a company's "continuing
employment of an agent known to the company to have made corrupt
payments in the preceeding two years in violation of applicable U.S.
laws or those of the country in question" would violate the FCPA.130
Would a company be required to perform a background check on po-
tential employees? Would a corporation be held responsible for failing
to withdraw from a transaction after learning that an illegal payment
has been made?
In an exchange of letters, Senator Chafee and Representative Wirth
proposed modification of the "course of conduct" standard. Represen-
tative Wirth has suggested a "knowing" standard for criminal liability
and a "reckless" standard for civil liability.' Both terms would be
defined as in the proposed federal criminal code. 132 Senator Chafee
rejects this dual standard preferring a "trading" standard for both
criminal and civil liability. '13 He agrees that civil enforcement actions
require "less evidence of 'knowledge.' ",13' Representative Wirth re-
jects the "knowing standard" for civil and criminal liability and recom-
mends deleting the "reason to know" standard and substituting
125. See Joint Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 325 (testimony of Senator William Proxmire, D-
Wis.). This "corruptly to direct or authorize" standard has been described as an "ostrich or
head in the sand approach." Id. at 395.
126. See, e.g., Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-200, 96 Stat. 122 (to be
codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 421-26 (1982)) which includes a "reason to believe" standard. See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26 (1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
AGENCY § 9 comment d (1957); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 comment b
(Tentative Draft Numbers 1-7, 1973); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12 comment a
(1965). See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2- 7 15(2)(a) (1981).
127. Id
128. See Joint Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 417, 418, notes 64-66 (statement of W. Dovrovir
citing United States v. United Marketing Association, 220 F. Supp. 299, 307 (N.D. Iowa
1963)).
129. See generally S. REP. No. 209, supra note 84.
130. Id. at 11.
131. See Letter of Wirth, supra note 85.
132. See Schmultz Memo, supra note 64, at 2.
133. Letter from Senator John H. Chafee, R-R.I., to Representative Timothy E. Wirth, D-Colo.
(Nov. 22, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Letter of Chafee]. See Signs of Compromise Seen in
Effort to Narrow FCPA, supra note 85.
134. Id
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"recklessly disregarding."' 35 Representative Wirth also questioned de-
leting the word "agent" from the list of principal violators. 136 Given
these difficulties of interpretation, it may be more acceptable to the
business community, as well as in the public interest, to retain the "rea-
son to know" language in the bribery provisions. It is well established
that the courts interpret such language to mean a "reasonable man's"
intent. 137
Conduct Excludedfrom Criminal Liability Under S 414
Facilitating Payments. Under the FCPA, facilitating payments
made without corrupt intent, 138 or to an employee of a foreign govern-
ment at a "ministerial or clerical level,"' 1 39 or not made to retain or
obtain business,' 4 ° are not proscribed. Senate bill 414 defines a facili-
tating payment not in terms of who is to receive the payment but,
rather, in terms of the purpose of the payment.' 4 ' The question thus
raised is whether a payment of an unlimited amount of money can be
made to a senior level official, so long as the payment was made in
return for a non-discretionary act?142
Payments Lawful Under the Laws of a Foreign Country. The second
exclusion under S. 414 and the Mica bill would permit payments when
135. See Letter of Wirth, supra note 85.
136. Id
137. See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 509 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1975), which followed the language
of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 9, comment d (1958), as keeping "in line with
the usual legal understanding of the phrase 'reason to know.' " 509 F.2d at 167. Quoting
from the RESTATEMENT, the court determined: "A person has reason to know of a fact if he
had information from which a person of ordinary intelligence. . . would infer that the fact in
question exists or that there is such a substantial chance of its existence that, if exercising
reasonable care with reference to the matter in question, his action would be predicated upon
the assumption of its possible existence." Id (emphasis added). For further discussion of
the "reason to know" standard (as associated with S. 708) see 127 CONG. REC. S 13969,
13972-73 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1981) (statement by Senator John Heinz, R-Pa.).
138. As expressed by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, "[t]he word
'corruptly' is used [in the FCPA] in order to make clear that the offer, payment, or gift, must
be intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official position in order to wrongfully direct
business to the payor or his client, or to obtain preferential legislation or a favorable regula-
tion." S. REP. No. 114, supra note 71, reprinted at 4108 (emphasis added).
139. The Act explicitly applies to issuers or officers, directors, employees, or agents of such issuers
who, acting corruptly, give anything of value to foreign officials, either directly or indirectly
(through an intermediary). However, it clearly exempts "any employee of a foreign govern-
ment or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof whose duties are essentially min-
isterial or clerical." See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
140. See S. REP. No. 114, supra note 138, reprinted at 4108.
141. S. 414, supra note 3, § 5.
142. See R. Shine, Congress Focuses on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Legal Times, Feb. 21, 1983,
at 34, col. I, and at 38, col. 1. Mr. Shine argues that the facilitating payment exemption
definitely should focus on both the purpose of the payment and the status of the office to
whom it is made. He proposed language which would criminalize facilitating payments
when they are "made solely to expedite, facilitate or secure non-discretionary governmental
action, provided that the recipient is not a foreign official involved, directly or indirectly, in
the granting of a contract by his government." Id at 38, col. 2. See also Letter of Wirth,
supra note 85; Letter of Chafee, supra note 133. The Mica bill takes a different approach, see
supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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lawful in a foreign country but illegal in the United States.' 43 This
exclusion was proposed in response to complaints that United States
companies were losing business because actions forbidden by the
FCPA are permitted in foreign countries and were undertaken by for-
eign competitors.'" Also, proponents of these bills argue that this pro-
vision would allay charges that the FCPA seeks to export morality.'45
Critics argue that the FCPA has caused American corporations to
lose business in foreign countries. Three official reports have provided
anecdotal examples of lost business. 146 However, no scientific studies
of lost business opportunities have yet been published. Moreover, Dr.
John L. Graham of the University of Southern California concluded,
after reviewing all available studies of lost business opportunities, that:
(a) During the 1978-1980 period, the FCPA had no negative effect on
export performance of American industry. No differences in U.S. mar-
kets shown were discovered in nations where the FCPA was reported
to be a trade disincentive both in terms of total trade with each country
as well as for sales in individual product categories.
(b) Since the 1977 statute, U.S. trade with bribe-prone countries has
actually outpaced our trade with non-bribe-prone ones.' 47
Dr. Graham further concluded that the FCPA has not hurt the compet-
itive position of American industry. 4 In fact, Dr. Graham's study
provides support for the proposition that improper foreign payments
are at least unnecessary.149 He suggests, therefore, that management
should question payments to foreign firms on economic as well as ethi-
cal grounds. 150
With respect to the notion that the FCPA exports American values,
David D. Newsome has suggested that the corrupt association of an
American company and a foreign official carries political implications
for both actors which other foreign multinational corporations need not
be concerned with.' 5 ' He notes that "American businessmen often ask,
'Why us?' Why should America's multinationals be singled out for re-
strictions when all around them their competitors operate without such
restrictions?"'' 52 Mr. Newsome concludes that the answer lies in the
unique position which American corporations have in world business
ventures and their role in foreign domestic affairs. "Our companies
143. S. 414, supra note 3, § 5(b); Mica bill, supra note 15, § 2.
144. See H. WEISBERG AND E. REICHENBERG, supra note 56, at 13.
145. Id
146. See generally DEP'T OF COMMERCE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON EXPORT PROMOTION
FUNCTION AND POTENTIAL EXPORT DISINCENTIVE, (Comm. Print 1980). See also DEP'T OF
STATE, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: REPORTS FROM THE FOREIGN SERVICE, 6
(Comm. Print 1981); GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 15-18.
147. See SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA Los
ANGELES, 2 BUSINESS RESEARCH REPORT (Oct. 1982).
148. Id
149. Id
150. Id
151. See House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 29, at 391 (testimony of D. Newsome).
152. Id House Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 29, at 391, 392.
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cannot escape the fact that their activities will never be totally detached
from local sensitivities relating to U.S. intervention of any sort in the
internal affairs of another country."' 53
Gifts. S. 414 would exclude from liability cases where gifts, offers,
or promises of anything of value are made to a foreign official which is
lawful in that official's country. 5 4 This exclusion was included after
several corporations complained that some United States government
officials perceived routine social gifts and expenses to a foreign official
as violating the FCPA.'55 However, this exclusion is unnecessary be-
cause Congress never intended to proscribe a routine social gift but,
rather, intended to prohibit only "corrupt payments '56 where an evil
motive or purpose or wrongful intent to influence the recipient of a
bribe is present. Moreover, this exclusion from S. 414 seems unwise for
policy reasons in that a majority of foreign nations' bribery laws pro-
hibit officials from receiving gifts in return for performing official
acts. 151
Travel and Lodging Expenditures. The bribery prohibition of S. 414
excludes travel and lodging expenditures associated with the sale,
purchase, and demonstration of goods, as well as such expenses associ-
ated with the performance of a contract with a foreign government. 58
However, due to the perceived ambiguity of the terms of the exclusion,
Senator Chafee, the sponsor of S. 708, dropped these final exclusions
from a proposed compromise that he and Congressman Wirth were
considering.' 59
Exclusivity Provision. Section seven of S. 414 would exempt foreign
bribery from prosecution under any other United States criminal or
civil statute. 6° This section was included to prevent corporations from
becoming simultaneous targets of prosecution under S. 414 and other
federal statutes.' 6 ' Section seven would also protect corporations in
compliance with S. 414 from prosecution under other federal
statutes. 162
153. Id
154. S. 414, supra note 3, § 5(b).
155. See Joint Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 154 (testimony of R. McNeil).
156. See S. REP. No. 114, supra note 71, reprintedat 4108.
157. See Letter of Wirth, supra note 85, at 11. Congressman Wirth notes a study of bribery laws
showing this fact. See Henriksen, Statutory Provision on Bribery of Public Employees-A
Comparative Table (1976) (unpublished internal document which is on file at the offices of
the Journal of Legislation).
This study was submitted to the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Con-
sumer Protection and Finance in December, 1981. Begun in 1976 when hearings were held
on the FCPA, this study is being updated.
158. S. 414, supra note 3, § 5(b).
159. See Letter of Wirth, supra note 85 and Letter of Chafee, supra note 133.
160. S. 414, supra note 3, § 5(b).
161. See infra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
162. S. 414, supra note 3, § 5(b).
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Both proponents and critics of S. 414 have reservations about this
section because pre-FCPA foreign payments actions had been filed
under the federal false statement 163 and contempt statutes,' 6" the fed-
eral conspiracy statute, 165 and the currency reporting statute.166 In ad-
dition, the Department of Justice has shown an interest in using the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 167 to
prosecute corporations. Proponents of S. 414 argue that section seven
fails to provide an exclusive basis for bringing criminal action. 6 8 Op-_
ponents169 argue that section seven of S. 414 could be used to impede
criminal prosecution of a corporation that conceals a bribe from an
agency such as the Export Import Bank. 170
'Impact of the Proposed Amendments on an International Bribery
Agreement
Background. By enacting the FCPA in 1977, the United States uni-
laterally attacked commercial bribery in an extraterritorial manner.
Critics have argued that such an approach places United States compa-
nies at a competitive disadvantage when doing business abroad.'
However, Congress also recognized the need to obtain multilateral sup-
port to halt questionable payments to foreign officials. Congress sought
to "strengthen the United States' position in negotiations concerning
bilateral and multilateral bribery agreements." 72 Congressional efforts
to obtain multilateral support were aided by the initiatives of President
Carter 73 which resulted in the general endorsement of an international
anti-bribery agreement. An interagency team headed by Department
of State officials succeeded in negotiating specific terms of the agree-
ment in the Committee on International Agreement on Illicit Payments
of the United Nations Economic and Social Council.' 74 The Commit-
163. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976). See Roberts & Abbott, The Law of Questionable Foreign Payments.-
Implications for American Business, PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD 141-151 (1983), for a dis-
cussion of actions filed under federal criminal laws rather than the FCPA.
164. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976). See Roberts & Abbott, supra note 163.
165. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976). See Roberts & Abbott, supra note 163.
166. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1058, 1059, 1101 (1976). See Roberts & Abbott, supra note 163.
167. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976). See also R. Shine, Remarks at the Practicing Law Institute Work-
shop on the FCPA (Oct. 15-16, 1979).
168. See generally Joint Senate Hearings, supra note 1.
169. 1d
170. The Export-Import Bank of the United States, known as Ex-Imbank, was established in 1934
and is the principle lending agency of the U.S. government with the purpose of financing the
export purchase of American goods and services. The Export-Import Bank may make direct
loans or guarantee loans made by American banks to American exporters or to foreign gov-
ernments, banks, corporations, or citizens. These loans are made in U.S. or foreign curren-
cies. The Bank has an authorized limit of $40 billion in outstanding funds at any one time.
171. North, The Economics of Extortion, 10 WASH. MONTHLY 30 (1978).
172. 123 CONG. REC. S19399 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1977) (remarks of Senator Harrison Williams, D-
N.J.).
173. See G. GREANIS & D. WINDSOR, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 69-71 (1982).
174. Draft International Agreement on Illicit Payments, Report of the Committee on an Interna-
tional Agreement on Illicit Payments on Its First and Second Sessions, U.N. ESCOR (2d
regular session, agenda item 9), U.N. Doc. E/1979/104 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Draft
Agreement]. See also Joint Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 270 (testimony of M. Feldman).
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tee adopted a report which included the Draft International Agreement
on Illicit Payments (Agreement) 17 5 and forwarded it to the Economic
and Social Council and then the Commission on Transnational Corpo-
rations. Similar in nature to the FCPA, the Agreement is based on
both disclosure and criminalization concepts. The Agreement contains
both accounting' 76 and anti-bribery'77 sections which are comparable
in concept if not in all details to sections of the FCPA. '78 The principal
differences lie in the types of business covered by the accounting provi-
sions. In order for coverage of the FCPA to be coextensive with the
United Nations Agreement, the FCPA provisions would have to be ex-
panded to cover all "enterprises and other juridical persons established
within the territory of a contracting state," ' 79 since it now applies only
to issuers subject to either section 15(d) or section 12 of the Securities
and Exchange Act.'8 ° However, the United States was unable to obtain
a decision by the United Nations Economic and Social Council to con-
vene a conference of plenipotentiaries because developing states in-
sisted on including article seven, which prohibited a contracting state's
nationals or enterprises from paying royalties or taxes to South Af-
rica. '8 In addition, the treaty was not concluded because developing
nations wished to link negotiation of the Agreement with the adoption
of a broad United Nations code of conduct for multinational enter-
prises. 82 This was seen as anti-Western and anti-free market, and led
industrial nations to refuse to attend a conference on the Agreement.
Nonetheless, President Carter pressed for such an agreement among
industrial nations at the annual economic summit in 1980183 and re-
ceived general support but no specific cooperation. The Reagan Ad-
ministration has continued to pursue an international agreement at
lower ministerial levels.'8 4
S 414 and Mica Amendments. Both S. 414 and the Mica bill man-
date that the President pursue an international agreement on brib-
ery.' 85 Such an agreement would include a process by which conflicts
associated with illicit payments could be resolved. The President
would report to Congress one year from the enactment of both bills.
The report would detail progress on negotiations, recommendations
See Note, A Comparison of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the Draft International
Agreement ofllicit Payments, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 795 (1980).
175. Draft Agreement, supra note 174, at 21.
176. See Draft Agreement, supra note 174.
177. Id.
178. See generally Note, supra note 174.
179. Draft Agreement, supra note 174, at 5.
180. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (1982).
181. Draft Agreement, supra note 174, at 5.
182. Joint Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 270 (testimony of M. Feldman).
183. President's Message to Congress Reporting on the Administration Policies, 16 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1689, 1693 (Sept. 9, 1980).
184. See Joint Senate Hearings, supra note I, 270 (testimony of M. Feldman).
185. S. 414, supra note 3, § 9; Mica bill, supra note 15, § 7.
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that Congress and the Executive should take to successfully eliminate
the competitive disadvantages of United States business, and steps nec-
essary to promote international cooperation. The report would also an-
alyze the potential effect of corrupt foreign officials and political
leaders on our national security.
Both S. 414 and the Mica bill assume the FCPA has placed Ameri-
can corporations at a competitive disadvantage. However, no empiri-
cal evidence exists to support this assumption and Professor Graham's
study, in fact, concludes that the FCPA has not placed American cor-
porations at a competitive disadvantage in international transac-
tions. I8 6 Nevertheless, both bills merit praise for their shared concern
over the need for an international agreement. This congressional con-
cern impacts on our allies, and gives the executive branch a tool with
which to negotiate. Assuming the President worked toward this end,
these provisions would demonstrate to our allies the seriousness with
which the United States approaches the issue of bribery and its desire
for an international agreement.
AMENDING THE FCPA: POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
BUSINESS COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED STATES
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was enacted following disclo-
sure to the SEC of improper or questionable payments by approxi-
mately 435 corporations.187 The three bills examined here, S. 414 and
the Mica and Wirth bills, would amend the FCPA in varying degrees.
S. 414 and the Mica bill have been supported in large part by the Rea-
gan Administration, the United States Senate, lobbying interests repre-
senting the business community, and professional associations
representing the accounting, legal, and financial communities. The
Wirth bill has been supported by a majority of the members of the
House of Representatives and by some academicians and lawyers. The
Wirth bill seeks to clarify the accounting and bribery sections of the
FCPA by defining accounting and bribery standards more specifi-
cally.8 8 This section of the article discusses the policy issues raised by
those individuals who have commented on the three bills and who have
become directly or indirectly involved in the amending process. For
purposes of analysis, the issues are categorized as ethical, legal, or eco-
nomic, but because of their complexity, most overlap and involve
socio-political questions.
Ethical Policy Issues
Many ethical issues have been raised in the amending process.
Should government be involved in legislating morality either domesti-
186. See SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, supra notes 147, 148 and accompanying text.
187. See SEC REPORT, supra note 9.
188. See generally Joint Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 270 (testimony of M. Feldman).
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cally or extra-territorially? Does the FCPA export American morality
in prohibiting bribery by American multinational corporations? Do
foreign multinational corporations export their morality to the United
States? Are the values of efficiency, profitability, and "right to export"
reconcilable with respect to laws, honesty, and United States national
security interests?
Business ethics has been defined as "the study of what constitutes
good and bad human conduct, including related actions and values, in
a business context."' 89 When discussing business ethics, one must in-
clude each manager's and employee's personal actions and values, indi-
vidual corporate values, and industry-wide values.
Several competing schools of philosophical thought have offered
theories of values which are useful in analyzing business ethics. These
philosophical schools include the utilitarian, natural law, and sociologi-
cal. Utilitarian theory states that actions are right or ethical to the ex-
tent that they promote a net happiness in relation to all of society.' 90
Business leaders, particularly those representing the export business
community, argue that without bribes to obtain overseas contracts, they
would be forced to shut down plants. This, in turn, would lead to un-
employment and society's subsidization of business through govern-
ment guaranteed loans. Furthermore, society would be forced to
subsidize labor through extended unemployment compensation pay-
ments, as well as increased public assistance expenditures. These busi-
ness leaders argue that the greater good lies in making bribes. Elected
officials often react favorably to such arguments because they fear that
an inability to make such payments would result in increased unem-
ployment among their constituents.' 9 1
However, such reasoning overlooks the fact that there are two forms
of utilitarianism, act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism. 192 Act-utili-
tarianism uses the net happiness test to evaluate actions on a case by
case basis. An action which promotes net happiness in one situation
(e.g., making a questionable payment to obtain a contract and success-
fully gaining the contract) will be ethical, while in another situation it
will not be ethical because it does not promote net happiness (e.g.,
making a payment to a government official for a contract and the offi-
cial is caught, convicted of bribery, and the company loses future pos-
sibilities of bidding on contracts).
Rule-utilitarianism establishes rules based on a generally applied
net happiness test. An action deemed unethical by virtue of the rule
will always be unethical regardless of the existence of individual cases
where net happiness is increased. For example, bribes or questionable
189. BARRY, MORAL ISSUES IN BUSINESS 3 (1979).
190. Dunfee, Business Ethics, BUSINESS LAW: KEY ISSUES AND CONCEPTS 29, 31 (T. Dunfee & J.
Reitzel eds. 1978).
191. See House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 29, at 220 (testimony of Representative Don
Bonker, D-Wash.).
192. See Dunfee, supra note 190.
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payments, shown to be inefficient and/or illegal, could not be justified
in individual cases even if such would produce desirable economic and
social consequences. 193 From a utilitarian viewpoint, those arguing in
favor of S. 414 and the Mica bill have adopted an act-utilitarianism
approach, while those favoring the present FCPA have adopted a rule-
utilitarianism approach.
Natural law philosophers believe that the source of standards for
ethical conduct is Divine or human reason. Ethical standards, once
adopted, are immutable and have priority over all man-made law. 19 4
The values of freedom, equality, liberty, and property in the United
States Constitution are rooted in natural law philosophy. Those indi-
viduals opposed to amending the FCPA may be characterized as argu-
ing that natural law values opposing bribes were incorporated in the
FCPA. Those favoring S. 414 and the Mica bill may be characterized
as arguing that the FCPA is unjust because it attempts to impose natu-
ral law values on other societies. These commentators propose amend-
ing the FCPA to bring it in conformity with the laws of foreign nations
thereby allaying criticism that the FCPA is exporting American val-
ues.195 If one of the proposed amendments is enacted, the United
States should begin to encourage other nations to amend their bribery
statutes to prevent importing illegal transactions into this country. 9 6
In addition, unlawful payments by American companies to foreign offi-
cials or other agents overseas could lead to retaliatory conduct by for-
eign multinationals in this country, thus creating a reverse flow of
bribes to American officials or agents. 197
The sociological school maintains that norms of conduct and values
are found in contemporary community values. They argue that those
values can be demonstrated using empirical evidence. Adherents of
this school argue that lawmakers should recognize competing interests
and values and make laws which reflect the priority which society has
given to certain values. 198 Supporters of S. 414 and the Mica bill per-
ceive the FCPA as adversely affecting efficiency and profitability of
corporations and the balance of payments of the United States. The
former represent significant contemporary business values, the latter a
national interest. When these values and interests are balanced against
honesty in international commercial transactions, the proponents of
193. Id
194. M. MACGUIGAN, JURISPRUDENCE: READINGS AND CASES 9-10 (2d ed. 1976). Adherents to
this philosophical school include Thomas Aquinas, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Charles Louis
de Secondat Montesquieu, and Thomas Jefferson.
195. See Joint Senate Hearings, supra note i, at 254 (testimony of M. Feldman). See generally
WEISBERG AND REICHENBERG, supra note 144.
196. For example, a United States court has held that the Japanese should not be allowed to hire
only Japanese citizens to manage their American subsidiaries and discriminate against
American citizens because it is lawful in Japan. See Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shojii America,
Inc., 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'don other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
197. Johnson, A Brief Dissection on Bribery in Foreign Markets (Aug. 16, 1982) (unpublished
manuscript).
198. See MAcGUIGAN, supra note 194, at 15, 16, 368, 369.
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these bills consider values of efficiency and profitability as more impor-
tant to society. Opponents of the bills note that almost all foreign
countries have enacted anti-bribery laws.' 99 Some have prohibited fa-
cilitating payments as well. Honesty and national security concerns,
thus, prevail as priority values.
The above discussion demonstrates that individual schools of philo-
sophical thought may offer different solutions to the same ethical
problems which require immediate action by corporate decision mak-
ers. Since its enactment, the FCPA has set the standard of ethical con-
duct for the American business community. In response to the FCPA,
most large corporations have adopted codes of corporate conduct.200
The American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business now re-
quires the study of business ethics in every school which it accredits.2 0 1
That curriculum must include "a background of the economic and le-
gal environment as it pertains to profit and/or nonprofit organizations
along with ethical considerations and social and political influences as
they affect such organizations. 20 2 It is ironic that, at the same time
individual corporations are adopting ethical codes, lobbyists for the
business community are encouraging Congress to amend the anti-brib-
ery section of the FCPA to permit American corporations to make
questionable payments. This raises the question of whether the values
set out in individual corporate codes are being represented by such
lobbyists.
Legal Policy Issues
Three significant legal policy issues have been raised in the FCPA
amending process. First, should the FCPA be a disclosure statute, a
criminal statute, or both? Second, should the FCPA have extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction to allow prosecution of corporations and individuals
who commit bribery abroad while involved in commercial transac-
tions? Third, should there be an expressed or implied private right of
action under the FCPA for shareholders, corporate employees, and/or
competitors?
Following disclosure of questionable payments by a large number
199. Hamilton, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. A Solution or a Problem?, II CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. I11, 134 (1981).
200. See GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 6-8.
201. See AMERICAN ASSEMBLY OF COLLEGIATE SCHOOLS OF BUSINESS, POLICIES, PROCEDURES,
AND STANDARDS, STANDARD IV CURRICULUM 26-27 (1982-83). See also BUCHHOLZ, BUSI-
NESS ENVIRONMENT OF PUBLIC POLICIES: A STUDY OF TEACHING AND RESEARCH IN
SCHOOLS OF BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT, Working Paper No. 41 (St. Louis 1979); BUCH-
HOLZ, BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT/PUBLIC POLICY: CORPORATE EXECUTIVE VIEWPOINTS AND
EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS, Working Paper No. 55 (St. Louis 1980). These studies, pre-
pared for the accreditation agency of collegiate schools of business, show the role of ethics
and social responsibility concepts in curriculum of colleges of business, and the desire of
corporate executives to include such views. See also POWERS & VOGEL, ETHICS IN THE EDU-
CATION OF BUSINESS MANAGERS (1980).
202. AMERICAN ASSEMBLY OF COLLEGIATE SCHOOLS OF BUSINESS, supra note 201, at 27 (1982-
83) (emphasis added).
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of American corporations, it was argued that the extraterritorial appli-
cation of our antitrust laws, 20 3 tax laws,2 4 and security laws, 205 and
other statutes2°6 would be sufficient to prevent further instances of for-
eign bribery. Because these laws emphasize the consequences of brib-
ery rather than the nature of the act, they were rejected.2 7  Two
approaches to prevent foreign bribery were recommended to Congress,
the disclosure approach 20 8 and the criminalization approach.20 9  The
Ford Administration recommended that Congress require full disclo-
sure of corporate records with civil and/or criminal penalties for falsifi-
cation 210 and many of these recommendations were included in the
accounting section of the FCPA.21 ' The Carter Administration en-
dorsed a criminalization approach.21 2 In addition to its disclosure re-
quirements, the criminalization approach would define specific
instances of bribery and impose criminal penalties for questionable
payments made abroad.
The FCPA incorporated both approaches in the accounting and
anti-bribery sections. The Mica bill and S. 414 would remove criminal
sanctions from the accounting provisions except in cases of knowing
misrepresentation21 3 and would prohibit civil injunctions.21 a Both bills
would retain the anti-bribery section of the FCPA, but would set out a
203. See Sherman Act §§ 1, 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982), and Federal Trade Commission Act § 5,
15 U.S.C. § 52 (1982), and Robinson-Patman Act § 2(c), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1982). See also
McManis, Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad. An Antitrust Approach, 86 YALE L.J.
215 (1976).
204. I.R.C. § 162(c) (1983). This section denies a business expense deduction for payments made
to an official or employee of a foreign country if the making of such would be unlawful in the
United States.
205. Prior to passage of the FCPA, the SEC proceeded on a theory that such payments violated
§ 13(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1982). The Exchange Act at this time did
not specifically prohibit such payment. However, disclosure was deemed appropriate by the
SEC staff because such payments were material as defined by the United States Supreme
Court in TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
206. Other statutes such as the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2399(c) (1976) re-
quires firms operating under the Act to report all commissions to the Agency for Interna-
tional Development (AID). Failure to do so violates 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) which makes it
unlawful to conceal information on any matter within the jurisdiction of any United States
department or agency. Also, firms financing purchases through the Export-Import Bank
must report to the Bank all commissions and fees that are included in a contract. Penalties
for failing to disclose or falsifying a report knowingly is a $10,000 fine and/or up to five years
imprisonment, 12 C.F.R. § 401.3(c) (1977). This raises serious questions about the airplane
industry's use of Export-Import Bank funds to make questioned payments in the Middle
East. (See generally Newhouse, The Sporty Game, NEW YORKER MAGAZINE (May 19 and
26, 1982)).
207. See Note, supra note 174, at 364.
208. See Prohibiting Bribes to Foreign Officials; Hearings on S. 3133, S. 3379, S 3418 Before the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., app. (1976)
(Ford Administration Task Force Report).
209. Id
210. See GREANIS & WINDSOR, supra note 173, at 65-69, 135.
211. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (1982). See also S. REP. No. 114, supra note 71, at 7-9, reprintedat 4104-
4107.
212. See Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic and Foreign Investment Disclosure. Hearings on
S. 305 Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 67 (1977) (statement of W. Michael Blumenthal, Secretary of the Treasury).
213. S. 414, supra note 3, § 4(b), and Mica bill, supra note 15, § 8A(e)(2).
214. See S. 414, supra note 3, § 5, and Mica bill, supra note 15, § 8A(e)(3), which prohibit injunc-
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new standard for criminal liability.2"5
Some commentators have suggested that a pure disclosure approach
be adopted since businessmen do not understand the criminal standard
set out in the FCPA.21 6 Moreover, the criminal standard "cannot be
made clearer since the issue is not a matter of law at all, but of moral
judgments . . 217 Professors Greanias and Windsor argue that "dis-
closure would cause the corporation to make its decisions with refer-
ence to a standard it professes to understand: the marketplace. 21 8 The
corporation would have to balance the cost of publicizing its questiona-
ble payments against the benefits of contracts obtained. Every corpora-
tion would have to weigh the impact of such disclosure on public
opinion, as well as take into consideration the fact that such informa-
tion would be available to prosecutors in foreign countries. This ap-
proach would, in effect, allow public opinion and potential investors to
determine what constitutes a questionable payment and the penalty for
making such payments. It would remove the SEC and the Department
of Justice from the decision-making process which determines what
acts constitute bribery and what the proper penalties are. Under such a
marketplace theory, companies would be "punished" by public opinion
and scrutable investors. The marketplace theory advocated by Profes-
sors Greanias and Windsor assumes full disclosure by the private sec-
tor and a public opinion that will not demand excessive regulation.
Disclosure of questionable payments from 1974 to 1976 led to the en-
actment of the FCPA and criminalization of overseas bribery. The
marketplace theory also assumes that all executives and boards of di-
rectors would be willing to pay bribes to obtain contracts. In addition,
it assumes that businessmen, because they cannot comprehend a "rea-
son to know" standard, should not be held accountable under the
FCPA. While recognizing that bribery is an ethical question, market-
place theorists seek answers based solely on an act-utilitarian approach.
However, they fail to consider competing philosophical approaches.
Also ignored is the impact of a pure disclosure approach on the na-
tional security and foreign relations of the United States, and the possi-
bility that foreign corporations will retaliate by making illegal
payments to American corporate officials in order to obtain contracts
and other favors.
tions against parties making a good faith attempt at compliance with the internal corporate
accounting controls established by the bills.
215. In particular, these bills provide explicit liability exemptions for payments to foreign officials
which: (1) expedite performance of routine governmental actions; (2) are permitted by any
law of that foreign country; (3) constitute courtesies, tokens of regard, or returns for hospital-
ity; (4) are associated with travel and lodging, selling or purchasing, or product demonstra-
tions or explanations; or (5) constitute ordinary expenditures associated with contractual
performance. See S. 414, supra note 3, § 5(b), and Mica bill, supra note 15, § 8A(b).
216. See GREANIS AND WINDSOR, supra note 173.
217. Id at 137-38.
218. Id at 138.
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Extraterritorial Application of the FCPA. Businessmen frequently
ask why American corporations and individuals associated with them
should be punished for bribery committed abroad. They note that the
United States is the only nation to criminally punish extraterritorial
bribery in commercial transactions and that civil law countries do not
recognize criminal sanctions against corporations. 219 Moreover, they
point out that some countries promote bribery or find it acceptable.22u
Finally, they argue that criminal prosecutions have not been successful
due to the difficulty of gathering evidence and the need for collabora-
tion with other countries on politically sensitive issues. Critics also
note differences between the enforcement philosophy of the SEC (a dis-
closure-oriented agency) and that of the criminal division of the De-
partment of Justice (where a prosecutor's mentality exists).22'
However, while it is true that the United States is the only nation
which criminally punishes extra-territorial bribery in a commercial
context, it is also true that civil law countries have long had anti-brib-
ery statutes applicable to individuals and agents of corporations. Fol-
lowing a survey of many nations' anti-bribery laws, one researcher
stated:
The [study] also indicate[s] that current legislation on bribery may be
traced back to the major penal codes of France, Germany and Spain.
More recently one may notice some acceptance of the more inclusive
concept of "corrupt practices" that has developed within English
speaking common law jurisprudence. 222
Private Right of Action. From an enforcement viewpoint, allowing
a form of self-regulation by creating a private civil right to enforce the
FCPA may be a far more efficient allocation of resources. One of the
few viable alternatives would be to hire many more enforcement em-
ployees in many departments and agencies. Under a pure market-dis-
closure approach, the enforcement mechanism would be enhanced by
shareholder suits alleging that illegal payments constitute wasteful use
of corporate funds.22 3
A private right of action under the FCPA could be created ex-
pressly by Congress or implied by the federal courts. Private actions
have been implied under the securities laws when congressional goals
were frustrated. 224 The courts have relied heavily on the presence or
219. Hermann, Criminal Prosecution of United States Multinational Corporations, 8 Loy. U. CHI.
L.J. 465, 468 (1977).
220. Note, Corruption and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 158.
This note points out that local agents in many foreign nations, particularly in the Middle
East and Latin America, become involved in "bribery for government contracts, demands for
protective money, and bribery for regulatory favors." Id at 160.
221. Note, The Criminalization ofAmerican Extraterritorial Bribery.- The Effect ofthe Foreign Cor-
rupt PracticesAct of 1977 INT'L L. & POL. 645, 661-63 (1981).
222. See Henriksen, supra note 157, at cover.
223. See WEISS, THE CORPORATE WATERGATE, INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER,
INC. (1975).
224. See J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-34 (1964), and Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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absence of a legislative history indicating an intent either to create or
deny a private action.225 However, it is not clear from the legislative
history of the FCPA whether Congress intended to create such a pri-
vate right of action.226
Senate bill 414, and both the Mica and Wirth bills do not authorize
causes of action. One critic opposes private causes of action for three
reasons:227 (1) the potential for harassment by competitors; (2) foreign
relations and national security issues are often involved; and (3) when
the SEC or Department of Justice refuse to sue, shareholders already
may sue in a civil action under state laws for corporate waste and
breach of fiduciary duty.228 Competitors can also sue under state un-
fair practices statutes.229
Economic Policy Issue
A single significant economic policy issue raised during the FCPA
amending process is whether the FCPA has resulted in lost business
opportunities for American corporations. Ambassador William
Brock230 and other members of the business community have provided
anecdotal comments and individual instances wherein they cite loss of
opportunities.23 The General Accounting Office report and other
studies also show instances of lost business.232 However, it is difficult to
rely on these studies because sensitive information is involved and cor-
porate witnesses are reluctant to testify publicly. Additionally, it is dif-
ficult to obtain and quantify data on lost business opportunities.233
While American corporations were arguing that the FCPA caused
significant lost business opportunities, United States merchandise ex-
ports grew at an average annual rate of twenty-two percent between
1977 and 1980.234 Moreover, other disincentives to exports expansion
225. See Cort, 422 U.S. at 82.
226. Only the House Report on the FCPA specifically stated that it intended a private right of
action. See H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 4 (1977). The SEC has argued that a
private right of action was created because the Senate-House conference report adopted im-
plicitly the House's position. See 466 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-F (1978) (statement of
SEC General Counsel Harvey Pitt).
227. Note, Effective Enforcement ofthe Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 32 STAN. L. REV. 561, 576-
78 (1980).
228. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619 (1979) (shareholder suit for breach of fiduciary duty
against General Telephone & Electronics Corporation for corporate payments to foreign
officials).
229. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, §§ 129, 130 at 944, 952 (4th ed. 1971). Prosser outlines compet-
itor's suits based on theories of interference with a business advantage and contractual
relations.
230. Ambassador William E. Brock is a United States Trade Representative and is Chairman of
the Trade Policy Committee, which is the interagency trade policymaking body.
231. See Joint Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 40 (statement of Ambassador Brock), at 139
(statement of P. NcNeil), at 192 (statement of J. Creighton).
232. GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 14-17. Most of all the studies are anecdotal in nature,
lacking in scientific principles of survey research, or simply inconclusive because of the in-
ability to quantify.
233. Id at 16.
234. See HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS, supra note 29, at 218 (See statement of Representa-
tive Wirth taken from DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, REPORT ON EXPORTS, 1982).
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must be considered. Such disincentives include export controls, lack of
approval of joint ventures under antitrust laws, lack of research and
development funds to assist the private sector and lack of foreign lan-
guage training. A study by Professor Donald Sternitzke concluded that
"over the last decade the lagging long run growth of American exports
has been due mainly to a loss of competitiveness of American manufac-
tured goods in affluent markets, and has been attributable only inciden-
tally to the commodity structure or mix of American exports." '235 While
Professor Sternitzke recommends four national policies to improve ex-
port sales, none include "clarifying" or amending the FCPA.
23 6
A study by Professor John Graham found that the FCPA had no
negative impact on the export performance of American corporations
in those countries where the business community had reported in-
stances of loss of business.2 37 "Market share of U.S. industries in coun-
tries where the FCPA is reported to be an important trade disincentive
was compared to U.S. market share in other countries. No differences
were discovered."23 This study included reports on fifty-one countries
constituting eighty percent of U.S. trade in 1979. The U.S. Department
of Commerce solicited responses from U.S. Embassy specialists in
those countries as to whether the FCPA was a disincentive to trade.
Aircraft industry sales particularly concerned Professor Graham be-
cause the aircraft industry argued that they lost significant sales in cer-
tain countries. The FCPA competitive disadvantage hypothesis is dealt
a blow by Professor Graham's study which showed that U.S. aircraft
sales slightly increased in those countries from 1976 to 1980.239
Based on available data, it is clear that the FCPA is at most a minor
disincentive to trade. Such variables as tariff barriers, the failure of
U.S. manufacturing companies to modernize plants and production
processes, the lack of tax incentives for research and development, the
failure to obtain congressional approval for exceptions to antitrust laws
for joint ventures, and the overall inflation factor have played major
roles in determining American export capabilities.240 As Professor
Graham suggests, a more efficient allocation of congressional resources
would be to concentrate energies on remedying these major disincen-
tives to exporting rather than on amending the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
235. Sternitzke, The Great American Competitive Disadvantage.- Fact or Fiction, 10 J. INT'L Bus.
STUD. 25, 32-35 (1979).
236. Id Sternitzke recommends that the Administration: (1) negotiate a reduction of tariff barri-
ers on a country by country basis, (2) promote reform at the international monetary system,
(3) encourage the private sector to bring on new production techniques, and modernize
equipment and factories, and (4) assist firms to open new markets in eastern Europe and the
People's Republic of China.
237. Graham, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A New Perspective (i), (July 1982) (statement
of thesis, unpublished manuscript) (to be published in Fall edition of COLUM. J. OF WORLD
Bus. (1983)).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 9.
240. Id at 10. See also House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 29, at 254-55 (statement of
Ambassador Brock).
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CONCLUSIONS AND LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions
Congress has sought to redefine what constitutes acceptable conduct
for American corporations doing business in foreign nations through
three proposals to amend the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. In
amending the FCPA, Congress must reconcile a conflict between those
who believe the present FCPA provides the best guidelines defining
appropriate conduct for American business engaged in international
transactions and those who espouse an efficiency view that the "right to
export" is best for this nation, the business community and the econ-
omy as a whole. This reconciliation process must be done in an equita-
ble manner because the failure to do so could be perceived by the
public as "gutting" the FCPA.24 2
Well-drafted amendments to the FCPA will help create a working
partnership between the United States government and American busi-
ness enabling the business community to compete more successfully
with other exporting nations. American business needs predictable and
understandable legislation to guide their conduct and the allocation of
resources when undertaking international transactions. S. 414 and
H.R. 2157 may benefit the American business community in the short
run but could lead to more stringent legislation in the long run if Amer-
ican businesses returned to pre-FCPA patterns of conduct. Some scien-
tifically sound studies have indicated that the current FCPA is only a
minor disincentive to export expansion with other variables being far
more important. However, a number of corporate executives have tes-
tified that the "reason to know language" of the FCPA's anti-bribery
provision has made their companies unwilling to enter into interna-
tional contracts, and resulted in lost business.
Recommendations
Congress should take several steps to alleviate American business'
unwillingness to enter into international contracts. First, Congress
should amend the accounting provisions of the FCPA so that only an
intentional failure to meet FCPA standards would expose a corpora-
tion or its officers, directors, and employees to criminal prosecution.243
Second, Congress should further use the definitions of the terms
241. Graham, supra note 237, at 11.
242. A recent Harris Poll indicates that business executives themselves have a split opinion as to
how the FCPA should be amended. The ,4ntibribery Act Splits Executives, BUSINESS WEEK
16 (Sept. 19, 1983).
243. The general enforcement provisions contained in section 32 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 require a standard of intent for criminal liability. The amended FCPA should incor-
porate by reference this section. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1982).
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"reasonable detail" and "reasonable assurances" as set forth in the
Wirth Bill. 244 The legislation or legislative history should include spe-
cific variables to be weighed in performing a cost-benefit analysis, par-
ticularly what qualitative and quantitative factors2 45  should be
included.
Third, Congress should amend the anti-bribery section of the
FCPA to include the following standard for criminal liability:
It shall be unlawful for any domestic concern or any officer, director,
employee, or shareholder of such when acting on behalf of the concern
to use any instrumentality of interstate commerce to corruptly pay (or
offer to pay) something of value, directly or indirectly to a foreign offi-
cial, political party, or official thereof, or any candidate for political
office, for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business.
Substitution of the word "corruptly" for the phrase "reason to know"
will alleviate corporate executives' fear that a "mere suspicion" of cor-
rupt payments is enough to invoke criminal prosecution. The statutory
definition of "corruptly" must contain a "reasonable man" intent or
"evil motive" standard.246 Additionally the statute must define the
term "facilitating payments." '247 Facilitating payments should be the
sole exclusion from the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA.248
Fourth, the FCPA should include a congressional directive requir-
ing the Securities and Exchange Commission and Department of Jus-
tice to provide Congress jointly prepared and uniformly agreed upon
guidelines for enforcing each provision of the FCPA within thirty days
following enactment of the amended statute. Specifically, the SEC and
Department of Justice must be required to provide a uniform interpre-
tation of the amended standard for enforcement of the bribery
provision.
Fifth, the amended FCPA should include a provision authorizing
the establishment of a commission to study the impact of the FCPA on
the American exporting business. This commission, composed of lead-
244. Wirth bill, supra note 15, § 1(4).
245. See Wolf and Shaw, supra note 100.
246. See S. REP. No. 114,supra note 71; H.R. REP. No. 640, supra note 72. These reports indicate
that the definition of corrupt payments should include this standard. The amended statute
should also adopt a "'reckless disregard" standard for civil actions. See generally Letter of
Wirth, supra note 73; Letter of Chafee, supra note 113.
247. Richard Shine, former head of the Multinational Branch of the Criminal Fraud Division,
proposes language which would not criminalize facilitating payments when they are "made
solely to expedite, facilitate or secure non-discretionary governmental action, provided that
the recipient is not a foreign official involved, directly or indirectly, in the granting of a
contract by his government." Shine, supra note 142, at 38, col. 2.
248. Facilitating payments must be the sole exclusion or exception to the anti-bribery provisions
of the FCPA to prevent the misconception that businessmen will be able to pay bribes to
foreign officials when it is lawful to do so in that country. Furthermore, limiting exceptions
of the anti-bribery provisions to merely one prevents payment of bribes under the guise of
travel expenses as set forth in S. 414 and H.R. 2154. See supra note 15 and accompanying
text. Allowing other well-intentioned exceptions to the anti-bribery provisions could lead to
a quagmire of reciprocal conduct that would further hurt the perception the American public
holds of Congress and the business community, and could create national security problems.
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ers of business and government, as well as academicians and research-
ers, should be directed to provide Congress with a complete, detailed
study within a year from the enactment of the amended FCPA.
Finally, Congress should adopt section 9(a) of S. 414, which covers
international agreements.249
249. S. 414, supra note 3, § 9(a).
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